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Abstract: Camerer and Lovallo (1999; henceforth CL) present thought-provoking 
experimental evidence that overconfidence might lead to excess entry into markets. As their 
findings are based on the majority of sessions exclusively consisting of male participants, we 
conduct two experiments in an attempt to replicate their study while including both men and 
women in all of our sessions. Our Experiment 1 closely follows CL design whereas Experiment 
2 employs a gender-neutral addition task and provides more control in assessing gender 
differences in overconfidence and excess entry. Using participants of both genders we are 
unable to replicate CL’s main finding that market entry decisions are driven by overconfidence. 
Contrary to CL, where self-selection increases the entry rate, in our Experiment 1 self-selection 
leads to less entry. This result is driven by self-selected females who rationally enter the market 
less often than self-selected males as their rank-determining performance on a sports and 
current events trivia quiz is worse than the performance of self-selected males. In Experiment 
2 we find no effect of self-selection on entry and no gender differences in entry rates or 
performance in the addition task. Our results point out that (i) the finding that overconfidence 
leads to excess entry is not robust to a population consisting of both genders; and (ii) the self-
selection effect is sensitive to both gender and task that is used to determine the rank upon entry. 
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1 Introduction 
Do optimistic biases predictably influence economic behavior of firms when entering 
into markets? A large body of psychology and social psychology literature documents that 
people are overconfident about their relative abilities or unreasonably optimistic about their 
future (Alicke, 1985; Dunning et al., 1989; Messick et al., 1985; Svenson, 1981; Taylor and 
Brown, 1988). Overconfidence of entrepreneurs and managers could therefore be crucial for 
understanding failures of new businesses. Camerer and Lovallo (1999; henceforth CL) present 
thought-provoking experimental evidence that overconfidence might lead to excess entry into 
markets. As women are usually less overconfident than men (Lundeberg et al., 1994), CL 
findings are based on the majority of their sessions exclusively consisting of male participants.1 
With the increasing numbers of women managers, entrepreneurs and startup owners over the 
past decades, it is paramount to ascertain whether the excess entry finding is robust to a 
population consisting of both genders. We therefore replicate CL study while including both 
men and women in all of our sessions. We conduct two separate experiments; the first one 
closely replicates CL’s design whereas the second one provides more control in assessing 
gender differences in overconfidence and excess entry. 
CL offer three possible explanations for business failures: (1) Quick exits that appear to 
be failures are actually hit-and-run entries that are profitable but brief. Profits are made if 
entering the market during the high peak, i.e. when profitability is high, and then leaving (or 
“failing”) when profitability dies down. Because of the fleeting nature of many business 
opportunities, a failure within a year of startup is probable and expected (Forbes, 2009). (2) 
Business entries are similar to lottery tickets, i.e. most firms expect to lose money and fail, but 
if they become successful, the payoff is large and worth the risk. Entrepreneurs understand the 
nature of risky entries and often report that the key to success is making profits on average 
rather than with every single investment. (3) Many entry decisions are simply mistakes due to 
underestimating the competitors or overconfidence about own abilities. Such mistakes are often 
hard to correct if the performance feedback is imperfect. 
Distinguishing which one of the three explanations influences business failure and to 
what extent can be challenging with happenstance data. To explore the third explanation, CL 
design an incentivized laboratory experiment testing for the effect of overconfidence in one’s 
skills on market entry decisions, i.e. whether overconfidence amplifies the market entry rate. In 
our study we use a mixed-gender subject pool to address the same two main questions as CL: 
1. Is there more entry when people are betting on their own skills? 2. Are participants neglecting 
the reference group when they volunteer to participate in the experiment, knowing that their 
payoffs will depend on their skills? The answers to these questions deepen our understanding 
of the origins of business failures and can help design better performance feedback 
mechanisms.  
Overconfidence occurs when an individual's certainty that his predictions are correct 
exceeds the accuracy of those predictions (Klayman et al., 1999). Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) 
identify three sources of overconfidence: people may overestimate their own abilities, perceive 
themselves more favorably than others perceive them, or perceive themselves more favorably 
than they perceive others. Indeed, a large body of psychology and social psychology literature 
provides evidence that people are overconfident about their relative abilities or unreasonably 
                                                     
1 CL’s experiment consists of 8 sessions with both genders participating only in sessions 1 and 2. Sessions 3-8 
were composed solely of male participants. CL use data from sessions 1-8 to analyze the link between 
overconfidence and excess entry as well as the impact of self-selection on entry decisions and data from sessions 
3-8 to analyze whether the excess entry was caused by overconfidence or underestimating how many 
participants will enter the market in total. 
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optimistic about their future (Alicke, 1985; Dunning et al., 1989; Messick et al., 1985; Taylor 
and Brown, 1988). The effect has been labelled “better than average”.2 
Related theoretical and empirical literature in economics and finance focuses on 
explaining economic phenomena and particular aspects of behavior associated with 
overconfidence (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002; Bénabou and Tirole, 2003; Daniel et al., 1998; 
Gervais and Odean, 2001; Weinberg, 2009). Overconfidence in one's skills or relative ability 
can, in financial markets, lead to excessive trading and lower returns (Barber and Odean, 2001), 
distortions in corporate investment decisions (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), value-reducing 
mergers (Roll, 1986) and to security market anomalies (Daniel et al., 1998).  It has been shown 
to influence the estimation of one’s own ability, performance (Clayson, 2005), level of control 
(Presson and Benassi, 1996), speed with which one can get work done (Buehler et al., 1994), 
accuracy of one’s beliefs (Alpert and Raiffa, 1982; Klayman et al., 1999; Soll and Klayman, 
2004; Healy and Moore, 2007) or even expert judgements such as the accuracy of diagnoses 
(Christensen-Szalanski and Bushyhead, 1981). Overconfidence thus appears to be a robust 
phenomenon present in a wide array of professional and business-related decisions, with market 
entry being one of them.  
The experimental literature, to a great degree triggered by CL, identifies numerous 
factors, such as task difficulty (Hoelzl and Rustichini, 2005; Moore and Cain, 2007) leading to 
overconfidence. An example of such task where overconfidence plays an important role is the 
introduction of risky products to the market (Simon and Houghton, 2003). Similarly, greater 
overconfidence tends to lead to aggressive behavior in the pursuit of higher wealth (Deaves et 
al., 2009). Interestingly, experience and specialization can, in some scenarios, contribute to 
overconfidence; for example studies by Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002); Glaser et al. (2005); 
Glaser et al. (2007) show that experts are more likely to be overconfident than relatively 
inexperienced subjects. However, some other studies find that overconfidence tends to decrease 
with experience (Christoffersen and Sarkissian, 2002; Gervais and Odean, 2001; Locke and 
Mann, 2001). The evidence on gender effects in overconfidence is also mixed as the findings 
appear to vary with the task, activity, and/or environment. For example, Beyer (1990) observes 
that the tendency to ascribe success to personal effort and failure to external forces is less 
pronounced in women, while Deaves et al. (2009) find little evidence that gender influences 
trading activity, hinting that more research is necessary to understand the prevalence of 
overconfidence and its driving factors. Testing market entry decisions in a population composed 
of both genders is a step in this direction.  
 Gender differences in overconfidence are closely linked to competitive attitudes 
of men and women. A large literature in this area demonstrates that competitive environments 
tend to hinder the performance of women, especially if the task favors men (Gneezy et al., 2003; 
Günther et al., 2010) and that women are less likely to self-select into competitive environments 
(e.g. Gneezy and Rustichini, 2006), even if there are no significant differences in performance 
and when overconfidence is controlled for (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007).3 Other recent 
studies examine factors that mediate the relationship between gender and preference for 
competition (e.g. Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012; Cadsby et al., 2013; Gneezy et al., 2009; 
Vandegrift and Yavas, 2009; Wozniak et al., 2014) and tasks and environments that mitigate 
this relationship (e.g. Andersen et al., 2013; Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012; Ertac and Szentes, 
2011; Flory et al., 2014; Healy and Pate, 2011; Müller and Schwieren, 2012; Niederle et al., 
2013; Vandegrift and Yavas, 2009). Our contribution to this literature stems from extending 
the analysis of gender differences to the market entry game and exploring whether the 
                                                     
2 A popular example of overconfidence is asking a group of average people about their driving ability. Most of 
them will say they are above average even though only about half can be better than average (Svenson, 1981). 
3 A notable exception is Price (2011) who does not replicate Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) competitiveness 
finding using a seemingly identical experimental design.  
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willingness to compete based on one’s skills depends on self-selecting into the experiment. 
Furthermore, by varying the nature of the task, performance in which is used to determine the 
rank, we are able to explore the sensitivity of gender differences in market entry decisions to 
whether the task favors one of the genders or not. CL’s design allows one to identify whether 
market entry, which is also a competitive task, is driven by overconfidence. In the market entry 
game, whether an entry is successful or not depends on the market capacity and the entrant’s 
rank. In one scenario, henceforth referred to as skill-rank, the rank is determined by 
performance in a task and thus the decision whether to enter depends on one’s confidence in 
his skills relative to others. In the control scenario, henceforth referred to as random-rank, the 
rank is determined randomly. CL find that in rounds when payoffs from entry depend on skills, 
excess entry is higher than in rounds when payoffs are determined randomly, providing 
evidence of overconfident behavior. Furthermore, excess entry is highest when the participants 
are told in advance that their payoffs will depend on their skills, suggesting that participants 
who self-select into such sessions neglect consideration of the reference group with which they 
will be competing.4 CL use expected average profits to distinguish whether the excessive entry 
is caused by overconfidence or underforecasting and find that overconfidence is the main 
driver.  
To the best of our knowledge, there is no study testing the robustness of the CL’s finding 
with respect to both genders. Including female participants, who have been shown to be less 
overconfident than males in various other contexts, constitutes a more conservative test of the 
effect of overconfidence on market entry decisions and increases the external validity of CL’s 
study. Our Experiments 1 and 2, designs of which are presented in detail in sections 2 and 4 
respectively, test the original CL’s hypotheses while also allowing us to compare the behavior 
of men and women.  
 
Hypothesis 1: There is more entry (and thus lower industry profit) in skill-rank rounds than in 
random-rank rounds. 
 
If participants are overconfident, they will enter the market more often in skill-rank 
rounds, which will result in lower industry profits, i.e. if the number of entrants is higher than 
the market capacity, the industry profit will be negative. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The profit differential between skill-rank and random-rank rounds in sessions 
with self-selection is larger than in sessions with no self-selection.  
 
The larger the skill-rank and random-rank profit differential, the more entry will be 
observed in the skill-rank rounds. If the entrants neglect the reference group, i.e. enter more 
often because of overconfidence in their skills but ignore that all other entrants are doing the 
same, the differential between the skill-rank and random-rank rounds will be larger in sessions 
with self-selection than in session with no self-selection.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The expected average profit is smaller in skill-rank rounds than in random-rank 
rounds. 
 
The expected average profit is calculated based on the forecasts of participants. If 
participants decide to enter because they think fewer people will enter, then the expected 
average profit will be higher in skill-rank rounds than in random-rank rounds. If, however, 
                                                     
4 Reference group neglect is also known in the literature as egocentrism (Kruger, 1999; Windschitl and Chambers, 
2004). 
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participants enter more often because they are overconfident about their relative skills, the 
expected average profit will be lower in skill-rank rounds than in random-rank rounds. 
As CL’s design varies market capacities across sessions, we construct a normalized 
entry rate, a novel measure that allows us to compare data across Experiment 1 sessions that do 
not have the same capacities in each round. Despite that, we do not obtain the same results as 
CL. In Experiment 1 we find only very weak evidence that the industry profit is lower in skill-
rank rounds than in random-rank rounds due to more entry in the skill-rank rounds. We also 
find that self-selection leads to less entry, in stark contrast to CL. This result is driven by self-
selected females who rationally enter less often than self-selected males, likely due to the nature 
of the employed tasks. We also find no difference in expected average profits between random-
rank and skill-rank rounds, suggesting that overconfidence might not be as strong of a driving 
factor of entry decisions when both genders are represented amongst the market participants. 
Regarding performance in tasks that determine the rank in skill-rank rounds, we observe that 
males perform significantly better on a trivia quiz about sports and current events (a task that 
could be perceived as favoring males) and are faster to complete the mazes task (which also 
favors males according to previous literature), however the latter result is not statistically 
significant. In Experiment 2 employing a gender-neutral addition task, we find no evidence that 
the industry profit is lower in skill-rank rounds than in random-rank rounds, signifying no 
difference in entry rates due to overconfidence. We also find no effect of self-selection on entry 
and no gender differences in entry rates or performance in the addition task.  
In summary, using participants of both genders we are unable to replicate CL findings 
that there is more entry in the skill-rank compared to the random-rank rounds or that self-
selection increases entry. Our results also point out that the self-selection effect is sensitive to 
both gender and task that is used to determine the rank upon entry. 
 
2 Experiment 1 design and procedures 
CL employ the market entry game introduced by Selten and Güth (1982) to study the 
link between overconfidence and decisions to enter the market.5 In what follows we present the 
CL modification of the game with rank-based payoffs. The design of Experiment 1 follows CL 
in terms of the implemented parameters, session ordering, and procedures to the extent known 
to us. Any differences are discussed below.  
In the repeated market entry game, each participant is endowed with $10 and is informed 
about the market capacity “c”, where c  {2, 4, 6, 8} (for the capacity in each round used in the 
same sequence in both CL and our Experiment 1, see Table C1 in Appendix C). The participants 
in each round simultaneously choose whether to enter the market or not. The payoff to the 
entrants depends on the overall number of entrants, market capacity c announced at the 
beginning of the round and the entrant’s rank. Entrants ranked below c lose their initial 
endowment, while entrants ranked c or above earn a positive sum of money (see Table 1). The 
top c entrants share $50 proportionally, with higher-ranked entrants earning more relative to 
other entrants.6 Non-entrants do not earn or lose any money; they keep their initial endowment. 
The rank is assigned randomly or based on the participant’s skills as determined by 
performance in a real-effort task. In CL sessions 1 and 2, participants were asked to solve 
“puzzles,” details of which were not reported as part of the experimental protocol. We 
                                                     
5 For a theoretical analysis of the standard version of the market entry game and a recent review of the empirical 
literature see Collins et al. (2017). 
6 If the number of entrants is lower than c, the entrants share $50 proportionally, i.e. the entrant with the lowest 
rank receives the smallest $ amount, the entrant with the second lowest rank receives twice as much as the 
previous one etc.  
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operationalize solving “puzzles” as completing “mazes,” a task that is comparable in terms of 
skills.7 In sessions 1 and 2 of our Experiment 1, skill-ranks are thus determined by the speed of 
completing five mazes. In sessions 3-8 of both CL and our Experiment 1, skill-ranks are 
determined by the number of correct answers on a trivia quiz about sports and current events. 
 
Table 1. Experiment 1 rank-based payoffs* 
Rank 
Market Capacity 
c=2 c=4 c=6 c=8 
1 33 20 14 11 
2 17 15 12 10 
3  10 10 8 
4  5 7 7 
5   5 6 
6   2 4 
7    3 
8    2 
* Payoff in $ for successful entrants as a function of “c” 
 
The game is played in two blocks, each consisting of 12 rounds (24 rounds in total). In 
one of the two blocks the rank is determined randomly (R), in the other block the rank depends 
on skills (S). This feature is implemented in a within-subject design, i.e. the same participants 
participate in both blocks of rounds. The participants are told in advance in which block of 
rounds the rank is assigned randomly and in which it depends on their skills. To control for 
order effects, in half of the sessions the block of rounds with random-rank is conducted first, 
followed by the block of rounds with skill-dependent rank. In the other half of the sessions the 
order is reversed, i.e. the block of rounds with skill-dependent rank is conducted first and the 
random-rank second. With the exception of sessions 1 and 2 as in the original CL experiment, 
the random-rank rounds have the exact same order of c’s as the skill-rank rounds and thus the 
two blocks are directly comparable. 
The design ensures all participants make decisions in both random-rank and skill-rank 
rounds and thus their decisions in the random-rank rounds act as a within-subject control for 
risk preferences, a potentially important consideration when deciding whether to enter the 
market or not. Given the considerable variation of risk-taking behavior observed in previous 
research (nicely summarized in e.g. Deck et al. (2013), such approach is simpler and likely to 
generate less noise than eliciting risk preferences using an unrelated risky task. Along with their 
individual entry decisions, the participants forecast how many entrants they expect in that 
round. For each correct forecast, the participants earn $1. CL use these forecasts to distinguish 
between participants who enter because they underestimate the number of competitors and 
participants who are overconfident about their skills and who therefore enter because they think 
their performance on the quiz or maze is better than average. The participants’ ranks are not 
revealed until the end of the experiment, i.e. after their market entry decisions for all 24 rounds. 
A total of 118 participants, 59 males and 59 females, took part in our Experiment 1. The 
experimental sessions were conducted in the New Zealand Experimental Economics 
Laboratory (NZEEL) at the University of Canterbury. Participants were recruited using the 
online database system ORSEE (Greiner 2015). Each participant only participated in a single 
                                                     
7 In an email conversation, CL provided further details that the puzzles in the first two sessions were “brain teasers” 
taken from a book they bought. Note that CL’s design involved solving ten puzzles whereas our Experiment 1 
design involved solving five mazes. We calibrated the number of mazes based on the expected time (10 minutes) 
it would take the participants to solve them. Our objective was to implement a task that would require display of 
skills but that would not unnecessarily prolong the experimental session. 
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session of the study, and had not participated in any similar market entry experiment run at 
NZEEL. 
The invitation, similarly as in CL, differed in information provided to the participants 
before signing up for the experiment. In sessions 1-4 the participants were invited to participate 
in the experiment with an opportunity to make money. In addition to that, in sessions 5-8, the 
participants were told in the invitation email that their payoff in the experiment would depend 
on their skills, especially their knowledge about current events and sports.8 In these latter 
sessions it was possible for participants confident of their abilities to self-select into the 
experiment (see Table 2 for the session overview). 
Unlike CL experiment, our Experiment 1 was fully computerized (i.e. including the 
mazes) using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). As reported in Table 2, the number of participants in 
a session varied from 12 to 16, following CL. All sessions were run under a single-blind social 
distance protocol in which there was a complete anonymity between the participants but not 
with respect to the experimenter. On average, a session lasted 50 minutes including the 
payment. The participants earned 13.80 NZD on average.9  
Upon entering the laboratory, the participants were asked to sit in a cubicle of their 
choice. At the beginning of the experiment instructions (provided in Appendix A) were handed 
out, as well as projected onto a screen and read aloud by the experimenter. The participants 
then had a few minutes to go through the instructions again, this time in their own pace. Any 
questions arising were answered in private. All participants had to answer the control questions 
(provided in Appendix B) correctly before they could proceed to the decision-making part of 
the experiment. This procedure allowed us to assess the understanding of instructions and 
clarify any confusion. After the control questions, the participants first entered their decisions 
in each of 24 rounds and only then engaged in a task that determined their rank for the skill-
dependent rounds. Upon the completion of the experiment, they were also asked to fill out a 
questionnaire. Participants were then called one by one to collect their payment in private in 
the control room at the back of the laboratory.  
 
Table 2. Experiment 1 sessions overview 
Session # n Invitation Block Order Task 
1 12 No self-selection R/S Maze 
2 14 No self-selection S/R Maze 
3 16 No self-selection R/S Quiz 
4 16 No self-selection S/R Quiz 
5 16 Self-selection R/S Quiz 
6 16 Self-selection S/R Quiz 
7 14 Self-selection R/S Quiz 
8 14 Self-selection S/R Quiz 
R= random-rank, S=skill-rank 
3 Experiment 1 results 
The section is organized as follows: We attempt to replicate CL’s results by applying 
the tests they use to our data. These results are always reported first. It is important to note that 
                                                     
8 CL do not report the details how their participants were invited to the experiment or what the communication 
channel was. The information included in the invitation email to participants in the NZEEL database was as 
follows: “Earn money in an experiment in which performance on sports and current events trivia will determine 
your payoff. If you are very good you might earn a considerable sum of money.” The latter part of the sentence 
is reproduced from the CL paper. 
9 For reference, at the time of the experiment 1 NZD = 0.7883 USD and the adult minimum wage in New Zealand 
was 14.25 NZD per hour. 
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in CL’s design, which Experiment 1 closely replicates, sessions 1 and 2 have a different order 
of c’s across rounds. That is, the participants in session 1 face a different order of c’s than the 
participants in session 2, making these two sessions not directly comparable. To rectify the 
issue, in addition to CL’s analysis, we (i) analyze data only from sessions 3-8 and (ii) we 
calculate the normalized entry rate that addresses the different order of c’s in sessions 1 and 2 
and thus allows us to perform tests on data from all sessions (i.e. 1-8). 
The industry profit, calculated by adding profits of successful entrants and losses of 
unsuccessful entrants in a given round, is strictly positive in 81 (=84%), negative in five, and 
zero in the remaining ten out of 96 random-rank rounds (12 rounds/session x 8 sessions = 96 
rounds in each block). The average industry profit across random-rank rounds is $29.28. Out 
of 96 skill-rank rounds, the industry profit is strictly positive in 76 (=79%), negative in nine, 
and zero in eleven rounds. The average profit across skill-rank rounds is $26.14. 
 
 Industry profit and market entry 
 
Hypothesis 1 states there will be a lower industry profit resulting from more entry in the 
skill-rank rounds than in the random-rank rounds. The hypothesis is based on a conjecture that 
when participants are betting on their own skill they will enter more often, which will in turn 
lower the total industry profit.  
Following CL, we first test for differences in the industry profit between the skill-rank 
and random-rank rounds using a matched pairs t-test.10 Recall that each experimental session 
consists of two blocks composed of twelve random-rank and twelve skill-rank rounds. The test 
is conducted as follows. The industry profit from the first twelve random-rank rounds in session 
1 is matched with industry profit from the first twelve skill-rank rounds in session 2. Similarly, 
the industry profit from the skill-rank rounds in session 3 is matched with the industry profit 
from the random-rank rounds in session 4. In the same way session 5 with 6, and 7 with 8 are 
matched. In sessions 3-8, each pair of rounds being compared has the same value of c’s, the 
same history (or path) of previous values of c’s, and differs only in how the rank was 
determined. We followed this procedure in order to replicate the original design by CL and so 
preserved the order of c’s in sessions 1 and 2. The matched pairs t-test does not detect a 
difference between profits in the random-rank rounds and skill-rank rounds (p-value=0.193). 
Our Experiment 1 result differs from the one obtained by CL who find that the industry profit 
is significantly lower in the skill-rank rounds than in the random-rank rounds when using 
individual data from sessions 1-8 (CL’s p-value < 0.001). 
The fact that participants in session 1 face a different order of c’s than participants in 
session 2, makes these sessions not directly comparable. We thus exclude these two sessions 
from the matched pairs t-test. The t-test for sessions 3-8 supports CL’s finding that there is more 
entry in the skill-rank rounds (i.e. more overconfidence in one’s skill) as the industry profits 
are lower in the skill-rank than in the random-rank rounds (p-value=0.084) albeit this effect is 
weaker than in CL.  
In order to be able to use the data from sessions 1 and 2 (which do not have the same 
order of c’s) we calculate a normalized entry rate for each round. The normalized entry rate is 
the ratio of the number of entrants and the actual capacity c in the respective round, where 100% 
means that the number of entrants was exactly the same as c in the given round. If the 
normalized entry rate is higher than 100%, there are more entrants than c. If it is less than 100%, 
the market is not saturated and it is possible for more participants to enter the market and make 
profit. By calculating the normalized entry rate we are able to control for different c’s in the 
given round between sessions 1 and 2. Using the normalized entry rate we then test whether 
                                                     
10 We report the t-test in order to make our results easily comparable with CL. 
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there is more entry (a higher normalized entry rate) in the skill-rank rounds than in the random-
rank rounds. The t-test does not detect a statistically significant difference in normalized entry 
rates between the skill-rank and random-rank rounds (p-value=0.482). 
In addition to tests reported by CL, one can also test for within-subject comparisons as 
each participant took part both in the random-rank and skill-rank rounds. To test whether there 
is a difference in industry profit as well as in normalized entry rates between random-rank 
rounds and skill-rank rounds within a session we use the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank 
test; p-values for each session are reported in Table 3 below. Except for the industry profit in 
session 6, where the profit in the random-rank rounds is significantly higher than in the skill-
rank rounds, none of the other tests show that industry profits are significantly different in the 
random-rank rounds than in the skill-rank rounds of the same session. 
In summary, using participants of both genders we find weak evidence of excess entry 
due to overconfidence when comparing behavior in the skill-rank rounds compared to the 
random-rank rounds. 
 
Table 3. The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test for the difference in industry 
profits and normalized entry rate between the random-rank and skill-rank rounds in 
Experiment 1 (within subjects) 
 Industry profit differences Normalized entry rate 
Session 
# 
Random-
rank 
Skill-
rank 
Wilcoxon 
matched-
pairs 
signed-
rank test 
(p-value) 
Random-
rank 
[%] 
Skill-
rank 
[%] 
Wilcoxon 
matched-
pairs 
signed-
rank test 
(p-value) 
1 370 450 0.310 140.0 131.8 0.843 
2 330 260 0.478 176.4 189.7 0.3762 
3 180 120 0.174 241.7 240.3 0.237 
4 330 310 0.657 191.0 195.1 0.693 
5 400 370 0.250 158.3 173.0 0.172 
6 330 160 0.012 184.0 231.3 0.009 
7 340 330 0.809 165.7 171.9 0.691 
8 530 510 0.657 94.9 108.8 0.265 
 
 
Reference group neglect 
 
Hypothesis 2 states that the profit differential between the skill-rank and random-rank 
rounds in sessions with self-selection is larger than sessions without self-selection due to the 
reference group neglect.  
Following CL, we first conduct a matched pairs t-test comparing the skill-random profit 
differential between sessions 1-4 (no self-selection) and 5-8 (self-selection), the result of which 
does not support Hypothesis 2 (p-value=0.432). Unlike us, CL observe that the reference group 
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neglect produces a significantly larger skill-random rank entry differential in sessions with self-
selected participants than in sessions without self-selection (p-value < 0.001); see Table 4 for a 
comparison of our results with CL.  
In addition to the test performed using data from sessions 1-8 as in CL, we run a matched 
pairs t-test comparing the skill-random profit differential between sessions 3-4 and 5-8 (i.e. 
excluding sessions 1 and 2 that have different order of c’s). This test also does not support the 
hypothesis that the differential is larger in sessions with self-selection than without (p-
value=0.659).   
In summary, applying the t-test (used by CL) to our data, we find that the profit 
differential between skill-rank and random-rank rounds does not differ in sessions with self-
selection than without self-selection, pointing out that the overconfidence effect does not 
increase with self-selection in a population composed of both genders. 
 
Table 4. Comparison of CL’s results and Experiment 1 results 
 CL 
(sessions 1-8) 
Experiment 1 
(sessions 1-8) 
Experiment 1 
(sessions 3-8) 
Avg. profit random-
rank 
$16.87 29.27 $29.31 
Avg. profit skill-rank $-1.56 $26.15 $25.00 
Matched pairs t-test 
t=-7.43 
p<0.001 
t=1.311 
p=0.193 
t=1.755 
p=0.084 
Avg. profit without 
self-selection, 
random-rank 
$19.79 $25.21 $21.25 
Avg. profit without 
self-selection, skill-
rank 
$10.83 $23.75 $17.92 
Avg. profit self-
selection, random-
rank 
$13.96 $33.33 $33.33 
Avg. profit self-
selection, skill-rank 
$-13.13 $28.54 $28.54 
Matched pairs t-test 
t=-4.08 
p<0.001 
t=0.793                           
p=0.432 
t=-0.447 
p=0.659 
 
 
Expected profit differential in skill-rank and random-rank rounds 
 
The results in the previous subsections provide weak evidence for overconfidence 
resulting in excess entry and demonstrate that self-selection does not increase the strength of 
the overconfidence effect. These tests, however, do not control for all possible explanations. 
Excessive entry in the skill-rank rounds may not necessarily be due to overconfidence about 
one’s skills, but due to the underestimating how many participants will enter in total. CL call 
this the “blind spot” hypothesis. If the number of expected entrants is underestimated, it 
decreases the participants’ payoffs because they enter even though they should not. In order to 
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test whether the expectations are correct, we ask participants to saliently forecast the number 
of entrants in each round.11  
On average, the number of forecasted entrants in all sessions is 6.07 and 6.23 in the 
random-rank and skill-rank rounds, respectively. The actual number of entrants in all sessions 
is on average 5.75 and 6.26 in the random-rank rounds and skill-rank rounds, respectively. The 
difference between the forecasted and actual number of entrants in the random-rank rounds is 
not statistically significantly different (Mann-Whitney, p-value=0.599).12 In the skill-rank 
rounds this difference is not statistically significant either (Mann-Whitney, p-value=0.916). In 
the random-rank rounds participants forecast about 0.32 entrants too high and in the skill-rank 
rounds their forecast converges to the actual number of entrants. 
To separate overconfidence from incorrect estimates of others’ entry CL use the 
obtained forecasts to compute the profit that a participant expects the average entrant to earn, 
calculated in a following way:  
 
Ej(πijt) = (50-10*(Fijt - cit))/ Fijt,      (1) 
 
where Ej(πijt) is the expected average profit, Fijt is the forecast of participant j used to calculate 
the profit that participant j expects the average entrant to earn, and cit is the capacity in the 
particular round. 
Separating overconfidence from incorrect estimates of others’ entry requires testing the 
hypothesis that the expected average profit is larger in the random-rank rounds than in the skill-
rank rounds. If participants decide to enter in the skill-rank rounds because they think that fewer 
other participants will enter, the expected average profit in the skill-rank rounds will be larger. 
Including Ej(πijt) in the entry regression, reported in the next subsection, will separate out the 
effect falsely attributed to skills. If, on the other hand, the participants enter because they are 
more overconfident in the skill-rank rounds compared to the random-rank rounds, not taking 
into account the number of entrants they expect to enter, the expected average profits will be 
smaller in the skill-rank rounds than in the random-rank rounds. The overconfident participants 
will expect to earn more than the average entrant and enter even when the expected average 
profit is low.  
Following CL, we therefore calculate the differential between expected average profits 
in the random-rank rounds (denoted πr) and in the skill-rank rounds (denoted πs), using only the 
rounds in which participants entered. A negative differential, i.e. larger profits in the skill-rank 
rounds than in the random-rank rounds, represents the incorrect estimation of entrants, whereas 
a positive differential represents overconfidence. In Table 5 we report the mean differential πr 
- πs, averaged across entering participants, the number and percentage of participants who have 
a negative mean (i.e. who expect less average profit in the skill-rank rounds), and the number 
and percentage of participants whose expected average profit is negative, on average, across 
the random-rank rounds and skill-rank rounds. For completeness, in rows 3 and 4 we also report 
a percentage of entrants whose profit is lower than 0 in the random-rank rounds and skill-rank 
rounds. 
The mean differential πr - πs is negative in sessions 1 and 2, suggesting an incorrect 
estimation of number of entrants by participants, and positive in sessions 3 and 4, suggesting 
the presence of overconfidence. In session 1, 44% of the participants expect to earn less in the 
skill-rank rounds than in the random-rank rounds. In sessions 2, 3 and 4, it is respectively 57%, 
46% and 67% of participants. In the self-selection sessions, the mean differential πr - πs is 
                                                     
11 The specific question we asked before each round is: “How many people (including yourself) do you expect to 
enter the market in this round?” If a participant forecasted the number of entrants correctly, $1 was added to his/her 
payoff in the respective round. 
12 CL only report a regression in which they use data from sessions 3-8. 
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negative in sessions 5-7, while in session 8 the differential is positive and suggests the presence 
of overconfidence. In session 5 only 18% of the participants expect to earn less in the skill-rank 
rounds than in the random-rank rounds. In session 6, 7, and 8 it is 57%, 38% and 75%, 
respectively. The t-test does not detect a significant difference in the average differential of 
expected profits per person between the self-selection sessions and sessions without self-
selection (p-value=0.913). In other words, there is no difference in the expected average profit 
between the skill-rank rounds and random-rank rounds. 
 
Table 5. The average differential in expected profits per entrant between the random-
rank and skill-rank rounds in Experiment 1 
Measure Session 
1 
Session 
2 
Session 
3 
Session 
4 
Session 
5 
Session 
6 
Session 
7 
Session 
8 
Total 
Πr - Πs -1.126 -0.665 0.023 1.832 -1.094 -0.886 -1.718 4.483 1.036 
# of 
entrants 
with Πr 
- Πs<0 
(percent) 
5/9 
(56%) 
6/14 
(43%) 
7/13 
(54%) 
4/12 
(33%) 
9/11 
(82%) 
6/14 
(43%) 
8/13 
(62%) 
2/8 
(25%) 
47/94 
(50%) 
# of 
entrants 
with Πr 
<0 
(percent) 
0/9 
(0%) 
0/13 
(0%) 
3/12 
(25%) 
1/11 
(9%) 
0/10 
(0%) 
0/11 
(0%) 
0/12 
(0%) 
0/8 
(0%) 
4/86 
(5%) 
  
Logistic regression  
 
Table 6 reports a fixed-effects logistic regression of the entry decision. Model 1 is the 
basic model. Model 2 controls for the demographic characteristics. In line with the t-test results 
using the industry profits as well as the normalized entry rates, we find that the entry rate in the 
skill-rank rounds is not higher than in the random-rank rounds.  
Unlike the results of the t-test, our regression results show that participants who received 
an invitation email saying that their payoffs in the experiment (variable Self-selection in the 
regression) will depend on their skills enter less often than those who received a generic 
invitation email without such information, which is in stark contrast to CL where self-selection 
increases the entry rate.  The coefficient associated with the interaction term of being male and 
self-selection is statistically significant in our data, meaning that in our self-selection sessions 
males enter more often than females. The difference in entry rates of males and females is 
highly statistically significant (p-value < 0.001; chi-square test). This fact also likely drives the 
result that self-selection leads to overall less entry. Table 7 presents a comparison of male and 
female entries separately for self-selection and no self-selection sessions. While we observe a 
slightly higher entry rate by males in self-selection sessions than in no self-selection sessions 
(the direction observed also by CL in their male-only population), this difference is not 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.296; chi-square test). On the other hand, females enter 
significantly less often in self-selection sessions than in no self-selection sessions (p-value < 
0.001, chi-square test).  
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Table 6. Experiment 1 fixed-effects logistic regression of the entry decision  
Experiment 1 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Coef 
(Robust 
Std. Err) 
Marginal z-
statistic 
(p-value) 
Coef 
(Robust 
Std. Err) 
Marginal z-
statistic 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
-0.096   
(0.143) 
 
-0.67   
(0.502) 
-0.367   
(0.403) 
 
-0.91   
(0.363) 
C 
-0.037*   
(0.021) 
-0.009 
-1.74   
(0.081) 
-0.038*   
(0.022) 
-0.008 
-1.70   
(0.089) 
Maze 
0.179   
(0.113) 
0.041 
1.57   
(0.115) 
0.208*   
(0.123) 
0.044 
1.69   
(0.091) 
E(πijt) 
-0.017***   
(0.004) 
-0.004 
-3.76   
(0.001) 
-0.016***    
(0.005) 
-0.003 
-3.50   
(0.001) 
Self-selection 
-0.682***   
(0.152) 
-0.042 
-4.48   
(0.001) 
-1.051***   
(0.175) 
-0.100 
-6.00   
(0.001) 
Skill rank 
0.045   
(0.132) 
0.032 
0.34   
(0.735) 
0.052   
(0.137) 
0.033 
0.38   
(0.706) 
Male 
0.038   
(0.136) 
0.114 
0.28   
(0.778) 
-0.051    
(0.154) 
0.101 
-0.33   
(0.741) 
Age    
-0.059***   
(0.010) 
-0.013 
-5.72   
(0.001) 
Non NZ 
Nationality 
   
-0.172   
(0.124) 
-0.037 
-1.39   
(0.165) 
Siblings    
0.093***   
(0.033) 
.020 
2.85   
(0.004) 
Relative Income    
-0.101*    
(0.059) 
-0.021 
-1.71   
(0.087) 
City size    
0.466***   
(0.053) 
0.100 
8.75   
(0.001) 
Living with 
others 
   
0.111***   
(0.027) 
0.024 
4.17   
(0.001) 
Money    
0.001   
(0.001) 
0.001 
0.06   
(0.952) 
Finance study    
0.001   
(0.001) 
0.001 
0.62   
(0.534) 
Rely    
-0.043**   
(0.020) 
-0.009 
-2.22   
(0.027) 
Law    
0.703***   
(0.157) 
0.149 
4.49   
(0.001) 
Humanities    
-0.070   
(0.179) 
-0.015 
-0.39   
(0.696) 
Natural Sciences    
0.286**   
(0.132) 
0.061 
2.16   
(0.031) 
Other Social 
Sciences 
   
0.846***   
(0.162) 
0.180 
5.24   
(0.001) 
Engineering    
0.609   
(0.143) 
0.129 
4.24   
(0.001) 
Medical Science    
-0.408   
(0.401) 
-0.087 
-1.02   
(0.308) 
Self-selection 
*Skill rank 
0.119  
(0.157) 
 
0.76   
(0.447) 
0.126   
(0.164) 
 
0.77   
(0.442) 
Self-selection 
*Male 
0.844***   
(0.159) 
 
5.32   
(0.001) 
0.979***   
(0.187) 
 
5.25   
(0.001) 
Skill rank*Male 
0.068  
(0.157) 
 
0.43   
(0.666) 
0.077   
(0.164) 
 
0.47   
(0.641) 
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Sessions 1-8 (CL report sessions 3-8; we provide such regression in Table C2 in appendix C), n=2832, standard 
errors are not clustered at the session level because of the small number of sessions. 
Description of demographic variables: non New Zealander represents participants who are not from New 
Zealand; Siblings represents the number of siblings; Relative income represents whether the income is far below 
average, below avg., avg., above avg., or far above avg. (from 1 to 5). City size, Living with others, Money, and 
Finance study represent respectively the size of the city from 2000 to 100 000+; number of people in a household, 
the size of the monthly budget, and the share of monthly expenses one finances alone. Rely is a self-reported 
variable that indicates on a scale 1 to 9 the reliability of the information provided in a questionnaire with 9 being 
the most reliable. Law, Humanities, Natural Sciences, Other Social Sciences, Engineering, Medical Science are 
dummy variables representing the fields of study; the omitted variable is Economics. 
Run on StataSE 13.0. Robust standard errors used.  
*, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
The remaining interaction terms in the logistic regression, Skill rank*Male and Skill 
rank*Self-selection, are not significant, suggesting that the effect of skill-rank on the entry 
decision is not mediated by gender or self-selection. We also find no gender differences in risk 
preferences as measured by the entry rate in the random-rank rounds.  
Similarly to CL, we also find the effect of the expected profit to be negative and 
significant. CL hypothesize that this is due to participants planning to enter and forecasting a 
lot of entry, so the expected average profit is lower when they enter and relate the explanation 
to the false consensus effect in which people use their own decision as a clue about what others 
will do. Finally, law, natural sciences and other social sciences students enter more often than 
economics students and participants in sessions with mazes enter more often than participants 
in sessions with the quiz when controlling for all demographics (Model 2 in Table 6). 
CL in their paper report regression results only for sessions 3-8, consisting solely of 
male participants. Recall that the rank in skill-rank rounds in sessions 3-8 is determined by 
performance on a trivia quiz about sports and current events. When restricting the dataset to 
sessions 3-8 of our Experiment 1, we find our two main results of self-selection decreasing the 
entry rate and self-selected males entering the market more often than self-selected females to 
be robust as both Self-selection and the interaction term Self-selection*Male remain significant. 
For the regression results from sessions 3-8 only, see Table C2 in Appendix C. 
 
Table 7. Number of decisions in which participants entered the market 
 Female Male Total 
Self-selection 189 (out of 696) 355 (out of 744) 544 
No Self-selection 307 (out of 720) 302 (out of 672) 609 
Total 496 657  
Note: In sessions 1-8 we have 1416 female decisions and 1416 male decisions. In no self-selection sessions we 
have 1392 decisions and self-selection sessions1440 decisions. 
 
Gender differences in performance on the quiz and in the mazes task 
 
To analyze whether the nature of the task affects performance, we compare the scores 
achieved by males and females. The results and Mann-Whitney tests comparing the 
performance for each session in Experiment 1 are summarized in Table 8. At the session level, 
we find that males perform better on the quiz only in session 5. Using pooled data from sessions 
3-8, however, we find that males perform significantly better on the quiz than females (Mann-
Whitney test, p-value =0.020), confirming that the quiz is not a gender- neutral task. We find 
Log-likelihood -1855.82 Pseudo R2       =    0.0303 Log-
likelihood 
-1732.88 Pseudo R2 
= 0.095 
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that effect to be mostly driven by self-selected males who perform significantly better than self-
selected women (p-value = 0.016), whereas there is no statistical difference between the 
performance of males and females in the sessions without self-selection (p-value = 0.606). The 
observed gender difference in performance in self-selection sessions is in line with participants’ 
decisions in the market entry game, as self-selected males enter the market more often than 
self-selected females. 
At the overall level, we observe no difference in performance of participants in the no self-
selection and self-selection sessions (sessions 3-4 and 5-8, respectively; p-value = 0.590, Mann-
Whitney test), signifying that self-selection into the experiment when using participants of both 
genders does not have the effect conjectured by CL. (Note that CL’s paper does not report the 
performance results of their participants.) Recall that reference group neglect, which is the 
reason for including self-selection sessions in the design, builds on the idea that excess entry 
rates could be the result of participants failing to acknowledge the strength of their competitors 
who also self-selected into these sessions.  
For the mazes task, we find that on average females are slower than males, but the 
difference is not statistical significant. However, this result is likely driven by the small number 
of observations (10 males and 16 females in total) as mazes were used only in the no self-
selection (1 and 2) as in CL’s design. 
 
 
Table 8. Average performance across sessions in Experiment 1  
 Experiment 1 
 
Male Female 
M-W test 
Session 1* 
       602.9 sec           623.5 sec 
z=0.092 
p=0.926 
Session 2* 
625.0 sec 641.1 sec 
z=-0.192 
p=0.848 
Session 3 11.55 12.60 z = 0.57 
p = 0.567 
Session 4 13.29 10.56 z =  -1.12 
p = 0.264 
Session 5 16.11 11.43 z =  -3.11 
p = 0.002 
Session 6 12.71 11.33 z =  -0.85 
 p =0.393 
Session 7 12.00 11.38 z =  -0.33 
 p =0.744 
Session 8 12.00 9.20 z =  -1.08 
p = 0.282 
*In Sessions 1 and 2, the lower the time of completing the mazes, the better the performance. The score in 
sessions 3-8 refers to the average number of correctly answered questions on the quiz. There is no difference in 
performance between no self-selection (Session 3 and 4) and self-selection sessions (Sessions 5-8), (Mann-
Whitney, p-value=0.590).  
 
4 Experiment 2 design and procedures 
While Experiment 1 closely replicates CL’s design, it also contains certain design 
features that might influence the behavior of males and females in different ways and thus affect 
the obtained results. First and foremost, mazes (or puzzles) together with a trivia quiz about 
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sports and current events might be viewed as male tasks (Günther et al., 2010), potentially 
affecting our results in two ways. Namely, including a male task in the design might create a 
direct effect of gender over rank and an indirect effect stemming from the participant’s 
confidence regarding the performance on the implemented task. To control for the task favoring 
a particular gender, in Experiment 2 we implement the so-called addition task, demonstrated 
by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) to be gender-neutral. We implement the addition task in all 
8 sessions. 
Additionally, the gender composition within each session might also play a role. Rather 
than ensuring that the overall number of males and females is constant, Experiment 2 ensures 
that an equal number of males and females participate in all sessions. We also keep the total 
number of participants constant at 14 across all sessions and announce this number in the 
instructions. Finally, the order of market capacities is also kept constant to make the skill-rank 
round directly comparable with the random-rank rounds. 
Experiment 2 was run in the Masaryk University Experimental Economics Laboratory 
(MUEEL) in Brno, Czech Republic since in the meantime both of the authors moved and 
NZEEL, where Experiment 1 was run, no longer existed. Experiment 2 was conducted in 
English by the same experimenter (Katarína Danková) and using the same instructions as 
Experiment 1 with payoffs denoted in Czech Crowns (Česká koruna or CZK).13 The MUEL lab 
policy was to pay on average 150-160 CZK for incentivized decisions, which was 
approximately ten times as much in nominal terms as the payment policy in NZEEL, where the 
average payments ranged between $14-16. The rank-based payoffs were thus calculated to 
reflect the ratios used in CL and Experiment 1 and set to be equal to the nominal values from 
Experiment 1 multiplied by ten. This approach ensures that the maximum feasible payment 
($33 in NZEEL and 330 CZK in MUEEL) is approximately twice as much as the average 
payment in the given lab.  
Each participant in Experiment 2 is thus endowed with 100 CZK each round and the top 
c entrants share 500 CZK proportionally (see Table 9 for details). The rank is assigned randomly 
or based on the participant’s skills as determined by number of correct answers in the addition 
task. All other procedures and parameterizations were analogous to Experiment 1. 
 
Table 9. Experiment 2 rank-based payoffs* 
Rank 
Market Capacity 
c=2 c=4 c=6 c=8 
1 330 200 140 110 
2 170 150 120 100 
3  100 100 80 
4  50 70 70 
5   50 60 
6   20 40 
7    30 
8    20 
* Payoff in CZK for successful entrants as a function of “c” 
 
A total of 112 participants, 56 males and 56 females, took part in the experiment. 
Participants were recruited using the online database system HROOT (Bock et al., 2012). Each 
participant only participated in a single session of the study, and had not participated in any 
similar market entry experiment run at MUEEL. On average, a session lasted 45 minutes 
                                                     
13 The exchange rate at the time of the experiment was 1 CZK = 0.045 USD. The show up fee in MUEL was 100 
CZK. 
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including the payment. The participants earned on average 245 CZK. 
As in Experiment 1, the invitation differed in information provided to the participants 
before signing up for the experiment. In sessions 1, 3, 5, and 7 the participants were invited to 
participate in the experiment with an opportunity to make money. In addition to that, in sessions 
2, 4, 6, and 8 the participants were told in the invitation email that their payoff in the experiment 
would depend on their skills, especially on their performance in an addition task. In these latter 
sessions it was possible for participants confident in their abilities to self-select into the 
experiment (see Table 10 for Experiment 2 session overview). 
Table 10. Experiment 2 sessions overview 
Session # n Invitation Block Order 
1 14 No self-selection S/R 
2 14 Self-selection S/R 
3 14 No self-selection R/S 
4 14 Self-selection R/S 
5 14 No self-selection S/R 
6 14 Self-selection S/R 
7 14 No self-selection R/S 
8 14 Self-selection R/S 
R= random-rank, S=skill-rank 
 
5 Experiment 2 results 
The industry profit is strictly positive in 76 (=79%), negative in twelve, and zero in the 
remaining eight out of 96 random-rank rounds. The average industry profit across random-rank 
rounds is 235.42 CZK. Out of 96 skill-rank rounds, the industry profit is strictly positive in 69 
(=72%), negative in twelve, and zero in the remaining fifteen rounds. The average profit across 
skill-rank rounds is 207.29 CZK. 
 
Industry profit and market entry 
 
As in CL and Experiment 1, we first test for differences in the industry profit between 
the skill-rank and random-rank rounds (Hypothesis 1). In line with our Experiment 1, the 
matched pairs t-test does not detect a difference between profits in the random-rank rounds and 
skill-rank rounds (p-value = 0.192). Results from both of our experiments therefore differ from 
the result obtained by CL that the industry profit is significantly lower in the skill-rank rounds 
than in the random-rank rounds when using individual data from sessions 1-8. 
Next we test whether there is a difference in industry profit between the random-rank 
rounds and skill-rank rounds within a session. The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test p-
values for each session are reported in Table 11 below. Except for the industry profit in session 
3, where the profit in the random-rank rounds is statistically higher than in the skill-rank rounds, 
none of the other tests show that industry profits are statistically different in the random-rank 
rounds from the skill-rank rounds of the same session. 
In summary, using participants of both genders we find almost no evidence of excess 
entry due to overconfidence when comparing behavior in the skill-rank rounds with the random-
rank rounds. 
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Table 11. The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test for the difference in industry 
profits and normalized entry rate between the random-rank and skill-rank rounds in 
Experiment 2 (within subjects) 
Session # Random-rank Skill-rank 
Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-rank test 
(p-value) 
1 3400 3200 0.874 
2 2300 2300 1.000 
3 2600 1000 0.021 
4 1400 1600 0.937 
5 2400 2200 0.873 
6 3400 3000 0.411 
7 4100 3700 0.297 
8 3000 2900 0.966 
 
Reference group neglect 
 
Recall that Hypothesis 2 states that due to the reference group neglect the profit 
differential between the skill-rank and random-rank rounds in sessions with self-selection is 
larger than in sessions without self-selection. To test the hypothesis, we thus compare the profit 
differential in the selection sessions (2, 4, 6, and 8) with the profit differential in the sessions 
without self-selection (1, 3, 5, and 7). As in Experiment 1, the matched-pairs t-test does not 
support Hypothesis 2 (p-value=0.298) or CL’s finding that the reference group neglect produces 
a significantly larger skill-random rank entry differential in sessions with self-selected 
participants than in sessions without self-selection (see Table 12 for a comparison of 
Experiment 2 results with CL.)  
In summary, we do not find that the profit differential between skill-rank and random-
rank rounds is larger in sessions with self-selection than without self-selection, pointing out that 
overconfidence does not increase with self-selection in a population composed of both genders. 
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Table 12. Comparison of CL’s results and Experiment 2 results 
 CL 
(sessions 1-8) 
Experiment 2 
 (sessions 1-8) 
Avg. profit random-rank $16.87 235.42 CZK 
Avg. profit skill-rank $ -1.56 207.29 CZK 
Matched pairs t-test 
t=-7.43 
p<0.001 
t= 1.315 
p= 0.192 
Avg. profit without self-
selection, random-rank 
$19.79 260.42 CZK 
Avg. profit without self-
selection, skill-rank 
$10.83 210.42 CZK 
Avg. profit self-selection, 
random-rank 
$13.96 210.42 CZK 
Avg. profit self-selection, 
skill-rank 
$ -13.13 204.17 CZK 
Matched pairs t-test 
t=-4.08 
p<0.001 
t= -1.053                           
p= 0.298 
 
 
Expected profit differential in the skill-rank and random-rank rounds 
 
Recall that excessive entry in the skill-rank rounds may not necessarily be due to 
overconfidence about one’s skills, but due to underestimating how many participants will enter 
in total.  In Experiment 2 we find that on average the number of forecasted entrants is 7.28 and 
7.31 in the random-rank and skill-rank rounds, respectively. The actual number of entrants is 
on average 7.20 and 7.53 for the random-rank rounds and skill-rank rounds, respectively. The 
difference between the forecasted and actual number of entrants in the random-rank rounds is 
not statistically significantly different (Mann-Whitney test, p-value=0.833). In the skill-rank 
rounds this difference is not statistically significant either (p-value=0.674). In both random-
rank and skill-rank rounds the participants’ forecast converges to the actual number of entrants. 
To separate overconfidence from incorrect estimates of others’ entry, we calculate the 
differential between expected average profits in the random-rank rounds and in the skill-rank 
rounds using only the rounds in which participants entered (see Table 13). The mean differential 
πr - πs is negative in sessions 1, 2, 4, 6, and 8. In sessions 3 and 5, the positive mean differential 
suggests the presence of overconfidence. In session 1, 41.7% of the participants expect to earn 
less in the skill-rank rounds than in the random-rank rounds. In sessions 3, 5, and 7, it is 
respectively 33.3%, 38.5%, and 36.4% of participants. In the self-selection sessions (2, 4, 6, 
and 8), the mean differential πr - πs is always negative. In session 2 only 35.7% of participants 
expect to earn less in the skill-rank rounds than in the random-rank rounds. In session 4, 6, and 
8 it is 57%, 53.8%, and 66.7%, respectively. The t-test does not detect a significant difference 
in the average differential of expected profits per person between the self-selection sessions and 
sessions without self-selection (p-value=0.223). 
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Table 13. The average differential in expected profits per entrant between the random-
rank and skill-rank rounds in Experiment 2 
  
Measure Session 
1 
Session 
2 
Session 
3 
Session 
4 
Session 
5 
Session 
6 
Session 
7 
Session 
8 
Total 
Πr - Πs -1.313 -1.679 0.069 -14.840 7.139 -9.071 -1.266 -6.172 -3.39 
# of 
entrants 
with Πr 
- Πs<0 
(percent) 
5/12 
(41.7%) 
5/14 
(35.7%) 
4/12 
(33.3%) 
8/14 
(57%) 
5/13 
(38.5%) 
7/13 
(53.8%) 
4/11 
(36.4%) 
8/12 
(66.7%) 
46/101 
(45.5%) 
# of 
entrants 
with Πr 
<0 
(percent) 
0/12 
(0%) 
0/14 
(0%) 
0/14 
(0%) 
1/14 
(7%) 
1/14 
(7%) 
0/13 
(0%) 
0/12 
(0%) 
2/13 
(15%) 
4/106 
(3.8%) 
 
 
Logistic regression  
 
Table 14 reports a fixed-effects logistic regression of the entry decision for Experiment 
2. In line with the t-test results using the industry profits, we find that the entry rate in the skill-
rank rounds is not higher than in the random-rank rounds. Our Experiment 2 regression results 
further show that participants in self-selection sessions do not enter more often than in sessions 
without self-selection. The coefficient associated with the interaction term of being male and 
self-selection is not statistically significant, meaning that in self-selection sessions males do not 
enter more often than females when a gender-neutral task is used to determine the ranking. (See 
Table 15 for a comparison of male and female entries in self-selection and no self-selection 
sessions.  While it appears that males enter more often in self-selection sessions than in no self-
selection sessions, the effect is not statistically significant at the 5% level with p-value = 0.071, 
chi-square test. There is no difference in the female entry rate; p-value = 0.702, chi-square test.) 
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Table 14. Experiment 2 fixed-effects logistic regression of the entry decision 
Experiment 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Coef 
(Robust 
Std. Err) 
Marginal z-
statistic 
(p-value) 
Coef 
(Robust 
Std. Err) 
Marginal z-statistic 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
0.106   
(0.135) 
 
0.78   
(0.434) 
1.682***   
(0.621) 
 
2.71   
(0.007) 
C 
0.043**    
(0.019) 
0.010 
2.20   
(0.028) 
0.038**    
(0.020) 
0.009 
1.93   
(0.054) 
E(πijt) 
-0.007***   
(0.001) 
-0.002 
-6.87   
(0.001) 
-0.006***   
(0.001) 
-0.001 
-6.64   
(0.001) 
Self-selection 
0.014   
(0.135) 
0.018 
0.11   
(0.915) 
0.016   
(0.145) 
0.018 
0.11   
(0.914) 
Skill rank 
0.165   
(0.135) 
0.030 
1.22   
(0.223) 
0.170    
(0.137) 
0.029 
1.23   
(0.217) 
Male 
0.014   
(0.135) 
0.034 
0.10   
(0.919) 
0.218   
(0.147) 
0.079 
1.49   
(0.137) 
Age    
-0.058***    
(0.019) 
-0.013 
-3.03   
(0.002) 
Slovak/Czech    
-0.388***   
(0.123) 
-0.088 
-3.16   
(0.002) 
Siblings    
0.044    
(0.057) 
0.010 
0.77   
(0.441) 
Relative Income    
0.025    
(0.063) 
0.006 
0.40   
(0.689) 
City size    
-0.034   
(0.053) 
-0.008 
-0.64   
(0.524) 
Living with 
others 
   
-0.175***   
(0.052) 
-0.040 
-3.36   
(0.001) 
Money    
0.001***   
(0.001) 
0.001 
3.86   
(0.001) 
Finance study    
0.004***   
(0.001) 
0.001 
2.68   
(0.007) 
Rely    
0.019   
(0.019) 
0.004 
1.00   
(0.317) 
Law    
0.011    
(0.199) 
0.003 
0.06   
(0.954) 
Humanities    
0.013   
(0.165) 
0.003 
0.08   
(0.935) 
Natural Sciences    
0.174    
(0.164) 
0.040 
1.06   
(0.288) 
Other Social 
Sciences 
   
0.621***    
(0.231) 
0.142 
2.68   
(0.007) 
Engineering    
-0.442**   
(0.208) 
-0.101 
-2.13   
(0.033) 
Medical Science    
0.721***    
(0.208) 
0.164 
3.46   
(0.001) 
Political     
-0.816***    
(0.244) 
-0.186 
-3.34   
(0.001) 
Self-selection 
*Skill rank 
-0.108   
(0.157) 
 
-0.69   
(0.492) 
-0.110   
(0.161) 
 
-0.69   
(0.493) 
Self-selection 
*Male 
0.232  
(0.157) 
 
1.47   
(0.140) 
0.231    
(0.170) 
 
1.35   
(0.176) 
Skill rank*Male 
.029    
(0.157) 
 
0.18   
(0.855) 
0.027    
(0.161) 
 
0.17   
(0.865) 
       
Log-likelihood -1799.63 Pseudo R2       =     0.03 Log-
likelihood 
-1737.71 Pseudo R2       
=     0.07 
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Experiment 2 sessions 1-8, n=2688, standard errors are not clustered at the session level because of a small 
number of sessions. 
Description of demographic variables: Slovak/Czech is 1 if the participant was Slovak or Czech, 0 otherwise; 
Siblings represents the number of siblings; Relative income represents whether the income is far below average, 
below avg., avg., above avg., or far above avg. (from 1 to 5). City size, Living with others, Money, and Finance 
study represent respectively the size of the city from 2000 to 100 000+; number of people in a household, the size 
of the monthly budget, and the share of monthly expenses one finances alone. Rely is a self-reported variable that 
indicates on a scale 1 to 9 how reliable is the information provided in a questionnaire, 9 being most reliable. Law, 
Humanities, Natural Sciences, Other Social Sciences, Engineering, Medical Science and Political Economy are 
dummy variables representing the fields of study, the omitted variable is Economics. 
Run on StataSE 13.0. Robust standard errors used.  
*, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
The interaction terms Skill rank*Male and Skill rank*Self-selection in the logistic 
regression are not significant either, suggesting that the effect of skill-rank on the entry decision 
is not mediated by gender or self-selection. Finally, Experiment 2 regression results reveal the 
effect of the expected profit E(πijt) to be negative and significant, along the lines observed in 
CL and Experiment 1. We also find that with higher capacity the participants enter more often. 
 
Table 15. Number of decisions in which participants entered the market  
 Female Male Total 
Self-selection 342 (out of 672) 378 (out of 672) 720 
No Self-selection 349 (out of 672) 345 (out of 672) 694 
Total 691 723  
Note: Due to the design of Experiment 2, in all sessions we have 1344 female decisions and 1344 male 
decisions. In no self-selection sessions we also have 1344 decisions and in self-selection sessions 1344 decisions 
as well. 
Gender differences in performance in the addition task 
 
The performance of our participants in the addition task, implemented in Experiment 2, 
provides support to Niederle and Vesterlund’s (2007) finding that the task is gender-neutral. At 
the session level, there are no differences between the performance of males and females in 
sessions 1-7 (see Table 16). In session 8 females perform better than males. Pooling data from 
sessions 1-8 we find no statistical difference between the performance of males and females (p-
value = 0.696). This result holds true for both the selection (p-value = 0.532) and no self-
selection sessions (p-value = 0.304).  
Unsurprisingly, we also find no overall difference in performance of participants in the 
self-selection and no self-selection sessions (even- and odd-numbered sessions, respectively; 
p-value = 0.979, Mann-Whitney test.) While this implies that also in Experiment 2 self-
selection did not result in better performance in the addition task, the performance of 
participants is in line with their behavior in the market entry game where also observe no gender 
differences in entry decisions and no effect of self-selection on the entry rate. 
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Table 16. Average performance across sessions in Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 
 Male Female M-W test 
Session 1 6.29 7.86 z =   0.71 
p = 0.480 
Session 2 8.29 8.43 z =  -0.06 
p =  0.949 
Session 3 11.29 7.29 z =  -1.28 
p =  0.199 
Session 4 10.29 8.86 z =  -0.45 
p =  0.653 
Session 5 8.57 8.86 z =  -0.39 
p =   0.697 
Session 6 9.14 7.71 z =  -0.58 
 p =  0.563 
Session 7 13.43 8.71 z =  -1.35 
p =  0.178 
Session 8 6.14 12.57 z = 2.26 
p =  0.024 
The score in sessions 1-8 of Experiment 2 refers to the average number of correctly solved addition problems. 
There is no difference in performance between no self-selection (odd sessions) and self-selection sessions (even 
sessions), (Mann-Whitney, p-value= 0.979).  
 
6. Discussion 
CL propose a novel idea that business failures might be caused by overconfidence of 
those who decide to enter the market. In testing their conjecture, they find that males 
overconfident about their skills are more likely to enter the market and that overconfidence 
increases with self-selection. In our two experiments, we seek to replicate CL using a sample 
composed of both genders, making it a more conservative, and given the increased number of 
female managers and entrepreneurs observed in recent years also more timely test of their 
conjecture. Apart from including both male and female participants, our Experiment 1 closely 
follows CL design and employs mazes and a trivia quiz about sports and current events as tasks 
based on which the rank is determined. Experiment 2 employs a gender-neutral task, controls 
for the number of participants in a session ensuring that the number of males and females 
participants is equal, and makes the number of possible entrants common knowledge. The order 
of market capacities is also kept constant to make the skill-rank rounds directly comparable 
with the random-rank rounds.  
Using both male and female participants, we are unable to replicate CL finding that the 
industry profit is lower and thus that there is more entry in the skill-rank compared to the 
random-rank rounds. While we find only very weak evidence of excess entry due to 
overconfidence in Experiment 1, we find no such evidence in Experiment 2. Furthermore, we 
are unable to replicate the finding that self-selection increases the entry rate in either of our two 
experiments. In Experiment 1 self-selection actually decreases the entry rate as self-selected 
females enter less often than self-selected males. In Experiment 2 we find no effect of self-
selection on the entry rate. In both experiments we observe that when participants are expecting 
higher profits, they enter less often, in line with CL.  
Regarding the implemented tasks, our data show that males perform significantly better 
on the quiz than females and that this effect is driven by self-selected males who perform 
significantly better than self-selected females. Females in self-selection sessions correctly 
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anticipate their worse performance and rationally enter less often than self-selected males. We 
also observe that males are faster to complete the mazes task, however, this result is not 
statistically significant. Finally, in the addition task we observe similar performance of males 
and females; the addition task thus appears to be gender-neutral. Consistently with 
performance, we observe no gender differences in entry rates in Experiment 2, whether in self-
selection or no self-selection sessions.  
Apart from the above-described differences between our experiments and CL, there 
might be additional reasons for the diverging results. First and foremost, our Experiment 1 was 
conducted in New Zealand and Experiment 2 in Czech Republic as opposed to the U.S., some 
two decades later than the original CL study. Furthermore, we ran both of our experiments with 
undergraduate students whereas CL experiments also included two sessions with MBA 
students. Second,  as seen in other areas of experimental research, for example dictator games, 
the results are often sensitive to a variety of seemingly innocuous variations (Cooper and Kagel, 
2009). It is therefore possible that our procedures deviated from the original ones to some extent 
(e.g., the recruitment protocol for the experimental sessions) and these minor procedural 
differences have in turn affected the observed behavior. The lesson in all this is that while we 
are unable to replicate CL findings that there is more entry in the skill-rank compared to the 
random-rank round due to overconfidence, we find the self-selection effect to be sensitive to 
the gender and experimental conditions, especially the task used to determine the rank upon 
entry. 
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Appendix A Instructions  
 
Experiment 1, Session 1 and 2 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question after 
we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach 
you and answer your question in private. 
 
Anonymity 
The identity of the participants will not be revealed to other participants at any time during the 
experiment. 
 
Show-up Fee 
If you agree to participate in the experiment you will be given $5, which is yours to keep. 
Structure of the Experiment 
This experiment is computerized. If you have any problems entering your decision, please 
alert the experimenter. The experiment involves two sets of decisions. Each set of decisions 
consists of 12 rounds (i.e. 24 rounds in total). These two sets differ in how the rank is 
determined.  
In the first 12 rounds your rank will be determined by your speed of finishing the mazes (as 
will be explained later). In the second 12 rounds your rank will be determined randomly.  
(Session 2 instructions read: In the first 12 rounds your rank will be determined randomly. In 
the second 12 rounds your rank will be determined by your speed of finishing the mazes (as 
will be explained later)). 
 
In each round you are asked to decide whether to enter the market or not. In the beginning of 
each round the market capacity “c” for that round will be announced. You can think of “c” as 
the size of the market. You will also be informed about the number of entrants in the previous 
round.  
 
Decision Making Task 
In each round you start with $10.  
If you decide not to enter the market, you earn nothing and lose nothing; your earnings for 
that round will be $10.  
If you decide to enter the market, your payoff in each round will depend on your rank relative 
to the ranks of other participants who entered the market and on the capacity “c”.  
 
If you entered the market 
Your rank and the capacity for that round determine if you are a successful or unsuccessful 
entrant. If your rank is less than or equal to the capacity, then you are a successful entrant. If 
your rank is greater than the capacity, then you are an unsuccessful entrant. The unsuccessful 
entrant will lose the $10 (s)he was given in the beginning of that round. The payoffs of 
successful entrants as a function of “c” are shown in the table below.  
 
ONE of all 24 rounds will be chosen randomly and your rank and decision in this round will 
determine your payoff. 
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Rank 
Capacity 
2 4 6 8 
1 33 20 14 11 
2 17 15 12 10 
3  10 10 8 
4  5 7 7 
5   5 6 
6   2 4 
7    3 
8    2 
 
All participants will take part in both sets of decisions in the same order. In each round you 
will be also asked to estimate the number of people (including you) that you expect to enter 
the market in that round. If your estimation of the number of entrants is the same as the actual 
number of entrants in that round, additional $1 will be added to your payoff in that round.  
 
The Maze 
After you finish all 24 rounds in the decision making task, you will be given five mazes to 
solve. You need to find the shortest way from one end of the maze to another. If you have 
highlighted all the correct squares in the maze, the OK button will pop up. Click OK in order 
to continue. The participant, who finishes the mazes the fastest, will be ranked number 1. A 
participant, who is the second fastest, will be ranked number 2 and so on.  
 
Correct way:    Incorrect way:         Incorrect way: 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example 
Suppose “c” is 2 and four participants decide to enter the market. The entrant with rank 
number 1 earns $33 and the entrant with rank number 2 earns $17. The entrants with rank 
number 3 and number 4 lose $10, i.e. their payoff for that round will be 0.  
 
Payment of Experiment Earnings 
ONE of all 24 rounds will be chosen randomly and your rank and decisions in this round will 
determine your payoff.  
All money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. Because your decision is 
private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision or your earnings either during or 
after the experiment. We also ask you to not gather near the lab after you receive your 
payment. 
 
Are there any questions?  
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Experiment 1, Sessions 3-8  
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question after 
we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach 
you and answer your question in private. 
 
Anonymity 
The identity of the participants will not be revealed to other participants at any time during the 
experiment. 
 
Show-up Fee 
If you agree to participate in the experiment you will be given $5, which is yours to keep. 
 
Structure of the Experiment 
This experiment is computerized. If you have any problems entering your decision, please 
alert the experimenter. The experiment involves two sets of decisions. Each set of decisions 
consists of 12 rounds (i.e. 24 rounds in total). These two sets differ in how the rank is 
determined.  
In the first 12 rounds your rank will be determined randomly. In the second 12 rounds your 
rank will be determined by your score on a quiz (as will be explained later). 
(Sessions 4, 6 and 8 read: In the first 12 rounds your rank will be determined by your score 
on a quiz (as will be explained later). In the second 12 rounds your rank will be determined 
randomly.) 
 
In each round you are asked to decide whether to enter the market or not. In the beginning of 
each round the market capacity “c” for that round will be announced. You can think of “c” as 
the size of the market. You will also be informed about the number of entrants in the previous 
round.  
 
Decision Making Task 
In each round you start with $10.  
If you decide not to enter the market, you earn nothing and lose nothing; your earnings for 
that round will be $10.  
If you decide to enter the market, your payoff in that round will depend on your rank relative 
to the ranks of other participants who entered the market and on the capacity “c”.  
 
If you entered the market 
Your rank and the capacity for that round determine if you are a successful or unsuccessful 
entrant. If your rank is less than or equal to the capacity, then you are a successful entrant. If 
your rank is greater than the capacity, then you are an unsuccessful entrant. The unsuccessful 
entrant will lose the $10 (s)he was given in the beginning of that round. The payoffs of 
successful entrants as a function of “c” are shown in the table below.  
 
ONE of all 24 rounds will be chosen randomly and your rank and decision in this round will 
determine your payoff. 
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Rank 
Capacity  “c” 
2 4 6 8 
1 33 20 14 11 
2 17 15 12 10 
3  10 10 8 
4  5 7 7 
5   5 6 
6   2 4 
7    3 
8    2 
 
All participants will take part in both sets of decisions in the same order. In each round you 
will be also asked to estimate the number of people (including you) that you expect to enter 
the market in that round. If your estimation of the number of entrants is the same as the actual 
number of entrants in that round, additional $1 will be added to your payoff in that round.  
 
The Quiz 
After you finish all 24 rounds in the decision making task, you will be asked to participate in 
a multiple choice quiz. There are 30 sports & current events questions in the quiz, each 
question has only one correct answer. You will have 10 minutes to answer all questions. A 
participant with the most correct answers will be ranked number 1, etc. If two or more 
participants correctly answered the same number of questions, the ties will be broken by the 
shorter amount of time taken to answer all questions. 
Example 
Suppose “c” is 2 and four participants decide to enter the market. The entrant with rank 
number 1 earns $33 and the entrant with rank number 2 earns $17. The entrants with rank 
number 3 and number 4 lose $10, i.e. their payoff for that round will be 0. 
 
Payment of Experiment Earnings 
ONE of all 24 rounds will be chosen randomly and your rank and decisions in this round will 
determine your payoff.  
All money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. Because your decision is 
private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision or your earnings either during or 
after the experiment. We also ask you to not gather near the lab after you receive your 
payment. 
Are there any questions?  
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Experiment 2 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question after 
we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach 
you and answer your question in private. 
Anonymity 
There are 14 participants (including you) in this experiment. The identity of the participants 
will not be revealed to other participants at any time during the experiment. 
 
Show-up Fee 
If you agree to participate in the experiment you will be given 100 KČ, which is yours to keep. 
Structure of the Experiment 
This experiment is computerized. If you have any problems entering your decision, please alert 
the experimenter.  
The experiment involves two sets of decisions. Each set of decisions consists of 12 rounds (i.e. 
24 rounds in total). These two sets differ in how the rank is determined. In the first 12 rounds 
your rank will be determined randomly. In the second 12 rounds your rank will be determined 
by your score (number of correct answers) in an addition task (as will be explained later). 
(Sessions 1, 2, 5, and 6 read: In the first 12 rounds your rank will be determined by your 
score (number of correct answers) in an addition task (as will be explained later). In the 
second 12 rounds your rank will be determined randomly. 
 
In each round you are asked to decide whether to enter the market or not. In the beginning of 
each round the market capacity “c” for that round will be announced. You can think of “c” as 
the size of the market. You will also be informed about the number of entrants in the previous 
round.  
 
Decision Making Task 
In each round you start with 100 KČ.  
 If you decide not to enter the market, you earn nothing and lose nothing; your earnings 
for that round will be 100 KČ.  
 If you decide to enter the market, your payoff in that round will depend on your rank 
relative to the ranks of other participants who entered the market and on the capacity 
“c”.  
 
If you entered the market 
Your rank and the capacity for that round determine if you are a successful or unsuccessful 
entrant. If your rank is less than or equal to the capacity, then you are a successful entrant. If 
your rank is greater than the capacity, then you are an unsuccessful entrant. The unsuccessful 
entrant will lose the 100 KČ (s)he was given in the beginning of that round. The payoffs (in 
KČ) of successful entrants as a function of “c” are shown in the table below.  
 
ONE of all 24 rounds will be chosen randomly and your rank and decision in this round 
will determine your payoff. 
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Rank 
Capacity  “c” 
c = 2 c = 4 c = 6 c = 8 
1 330 200 140 110 
2 170 150 120 100 
3  100 100 80 
4  50 70 70 
5   50 60 
6   20 40 
7    30 
8    20 
 
All participants will take part in both sets of decisions in the same order. In each round you will 
be also asked to estimate the number of people (including you) that you expect to enter the 
market in that round. If your estimation of the number of entrants is the same as the actual 
number of entrants in that round, additional 10 KČ will be added to your payoff in that round.  
 
Addition Task 
After you finish all 24 rounds in the decision making task, you will be asked to participate in 
an addition task.  
In this addition task, you will be asked to calculate the sum of five randomly chosen two-digit 
numbers. You will be given 5 minutes to calculate the correct sum of a series of these problems. 
You cannot use a calculator to determine this sum, however you are welcome to write the 
numbers down and make use of the provided scratch paper. You submit an answer by clicking 
the OK button with your mouse.  
 
A participant with the most correct answers will be ranked number 1, etc. If two or more 
participants correctly answered the same number of questions, the ties will be broken by the 
shorter amount of time taken to answer the problems. 
Example 
Suppose “c” is 2 and four participants decide to enter the market. The entrant with rank number 
1 earns 330 KČ and the entrant with rank number 2 earns 170 KČ. The entrants with rank 
number 3 and number 4 lose 100 KČ, i.e. their payoff for that round will be 0. 
 
Payment of Experiment Earnings 
ONE of all 24 rounds will be chosen randomly and your rank and decisions in this round will 
determine your payoff.  
 
All money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. Because your decision is 
private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision or your earnings either during or after 
the experiment. We also ask you to not gather near the lab after you receive your payment. 
Are there any questions?  
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Appendix B Control Questions 
 
1. How much would you earn in a round if c=6, you entered and your rank was 5 among 
the entrants?  
 
2. How much would you earn in a round if c=2, you entered and your rank was 4 among 
the entrants?  
 
3. How much would you earn in a round if you decided not to enter the market? 
 
4. How many rounds are there in total in this experiment? 
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Appendix C Auxiliary Tables 
 
 
Table C1. Market capacity "c" values in CL and Experiment 1. 
Round Session 1 Session 2 Session 3-6 Session 7 and 8 
1 2 8 2 4 
2 4 4 6 2 
3 8 2 4 6 
4 6 6 4 8 
5 4 4 2 6 
6 2 2 6 4 
7 8 8 4 2 
8 6 6 6 8 
9 4 4 2 6 
10 6 2 6 4 
11 8 8 4 2 
12 2 6 2 8 
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Table C2. Experiment 1 fixed-effects logistic regression of the entry decision, sessions 3-8 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Coef 
(R Std. 
Err) 
Marginal z-statistic 
(p-value) 
Coef 
(Robust 
Std. Err) 
Marginal z-statistic 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
-0.050   
(0.170) 
 
-0.29   
(0.770) 
0.344   
(0.497) 
 
0.69    
(0.489) 
C 
-0.038   
(0.025) 
-0.009 
-1.56   
(0.118) 
-0.029   
(0.026) 
-0.006 
-1.13   
(0.259) 
E(πijt) 
-0.006   
(0.004) 
-0.001 
-1.50   
(0.130) 
-0.008*   
(0.004) 
-0.002 
-1.74   
(0.081) 
Self-selection 
-0.802***   
(0.167) 
-0.042 
-4.80   
(0.001) 
-1.234***   
(0.200) 
-0.106 
-6.17   
(0.001) 
Skill rank 
0.078   
(0.177) 
0.040 
0.44    
(0.659) 
0.084   
(0.182) 
0.040 
0.46    
(0.644) 
Male 
-0.180   
(0.173) 
0.123 
-1.04   
(0.299) 
-0.239   
(0.192) 
0.127 
-1.24   
(0.215) 
Age    
-0.075***   
(0.012) 
-0.016 
-6.05   
(0.001) 
Non NZ 
Nationality 
   
-0.137   
(0.133) 
-0.029 
-1.03   
(0.304) 
Siblings    
-0.033   
(0.037) 
-0.007 
-0.89   
(0.372) 
Relative Income    
-0.076   
(0.072) 
-0.016 
-1.05   
(0.291) 
City size    
0.506***   
(0.063) 
0.107 
8.04    
(0.001) 
Living with 
others 
   
0.057   
(0.032) 
0.012 
1.81    
(0.071) 
Money    
0.001   
(0.001) 
0.001 
0.18    
(0.858) 
Finance study    
0.003*   
(0.002) 
0.001 
1.77    
(0.076) 
Rely    
-0.074***   
(0.022) 
-0.016 
-3.38   
(0.001) 
Law    
0.770***   
(0.164) 
0.162 
4.69    
(0.001) 
Humanities    
-0.056   
(0.210) 
-0.012 
-0.26   
(0.791) 
Natural 
Sciences 
   
0.261*   
(0.158) 
0.055 
1.65    
(0.098) 
Other Social 
Sciences 
   
0.956***   
(0.167) 
0.202 
5.73    
(0.001) 
Engineering    
0.622***   
(0.166) 
0.131 
3.76    
(0.001) 
Medical Science    
-0.580     
(0.413) 
-0.122 
-1.40   
(0.161) 
Self-selection 
*Skill rank 
0.087   
(0.184) 
 
0.47    
(0.636) 
0.097   
(0.190) 
 
0.51    
(0.610) 
Self-
selection*Male 
1.048***   
(0.186) 
 
5.63    
(0.001) 
1.252***   
(0.228) 
 
5.48    
(0.001) 
Skill rank *Male 
0.072   
(0.179) 
 
0.40    
(0.686) 
0.081   
(0.187) 
 
0.43    
(0.666) 
       
Log-likelihood -1356.111 Pseudo R2       =    0.085 
Log-
likelihood 
-1355.0 
Pseudo R2 = 
0.086 
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Sessions 3-8, n=2208, standard errors are not clustered at the session level because of a small number of 
sessions. 
Task Score variable is included in the regression to approximate participants’ perceptions of their own skills. Note 
that the timing of the experiment inhibits causality from performance to market entry. 24 participants entered the 
market zero times during the entire session. 
Description of demographic variables: non New Zealander represents participants who are not from New 
Zealand; Siblings represents the number of siblings; Relative income represents whether the income is far below 
average, below avg., avg., above avg., or far above avg. (from 1 to 5). City size, Living with others, Money, and 
Finance study represent respectively the size of the city from 2000 to 100 000+; number of people in a household, 
the size of the monthly budget, and the share of monthly expenses one finances alone. Rely is a self-reported 
variable that indicates on a scale 1 to 9 the reliability of the information provided in a questionnaire with 9 being 
the most reliable. Law, Humanities, Natural Sciences, Other Social Sciences, Engineering, Medical Science are 
dummy variables representing the fields of study; the omitted variable is Economics. 
Run on StataSE 13.0. Robust standard errors used.  
*, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
